In 2002, transfusion-associated transmission (TAT) of West Nile virus (WNV) infection acquired through blood transfusion marked the emergence of a new threat to the U.S. blood supply (1). Although mosquito-borne transmission remains the predominant mode of WNV transmission (2), identification of TAT underscored the need for WNV screening of donated blood. In June 2003, blood-collection agencies (BCAs) implemented investigational WNV nucleic acidamplification tests (NATs) to screen all blood donations and identify potentially infectious donations for quarantine and retrieval. This screening was performed on approximately 6 million units during June-December 2003, resulting in the removal of at least 818 viremic blood donations from the blood supply. This report summarizes the results of blood-donation screening tests conducted during 2003 and describes six cases of WNV TAT that occurred because of transfusion of components containing low levels of virus not detected by the testing algorithm. These data indicate that blood screening for WNV has improved blood safety. However, a small risk of WNV transfusion-associated transmission remains. To address this risk, changes to screening strategies are planned for 2004.
In 2002, transfusion-associated transmission (TAT) of West Nile virus (WNV) infection acquired through blood transfusion marked the emergence of a new threat to the U.S. blood supply (1) . Although mosquito-borne transmission remains the predominant mode of WNV transmission (2) , identification of TAT underscored the need for WNV screening of donated blood. In June 2003, blood-collection agencies (BCAs) implemented investigational WNV nucleic acidamplification tests (NATs) to screen all blood donations and identify potentially infectious donations for quarantine and retrieval. This screening was performed on approximately 6 million units during June-December 2003, resulting in the removal of at least 818 viremic blood donations from the blood supply. This report summarizes the results of blood-donation screening tests conducted during 2003 and describes six cases of WNV TAT that occurred because of transfusion of components containing low levels of virus not detected by the testing algorithm. These data indicate that blood screening for WNV has improved blood safety. However, a small risk of WNV transfusion-associated transmission remains. To address this risk, changes to screening strategies are planned for 2004.
BCA Testing Activities
In June 2003, under the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) investigational new drug (IND) mechanism, BCAs began screening donations by using NATs from two test-kit manufacturers. Initial screening protocols included NAT performed on mini-pools (MP NAT) of samples from six or 16 donations, depending on the test-kit manufacturer. Donation samples that were part of reactive mini-pools were tested individually. Any reactive samples were retested by individual donation testing (IDT NAT). In certain cases, an alternate sample from the same donation or an alternate NAT might have been used for retesting. In addition, selected blood banks serving areas with epidemic activity stopped using this MP NAT screening algorithm and implemented IDT NAT screening during limited periods of the epidemic season. Donors of IDT NAT-reactive samples identified by either screening method were asked to participate in a BCA-directed followup study to confirm WNV infection and evaluate for the persistence of WNV RNA in blood samples collected subsequently. Both follow-up samples and the indexdonation samples were tested for WNV-specific IgM antibody. Donations that were IDT NAT-reactive were not released for transfusion; these donors were deferred from donating blood again until >28 days after the date of collection for the last NAT-reactive sample and the documented development of WNV-specific antibody.
To determine the sensitivity of the MP NAT-screening algorithm, certain BCAs performed retrospective testing studies in selected areas that experienced high rates of viremic donations. In these studies, individual components of archived MP NATnegative donation samples were retested by IDT NAT.
Surveillance Activities
For surveillance purposes, a donation that was repeatedly reactive on IDT NAT was considered to be from a presumptive viremic donor (PVD). Cooperating local blood centers provided reports of PVDs (including donor age, sex, postal code, and date of donation) to state health departments, which provided reports to ArboNET, the national arbovirus surveillance system.
Since 2002, public health authorities have been encouraged to investigate reports of WNV illness among patients who had received blood transfusions <4 weeks before illness onset and to report these suspected TAT cases to CDC. A probable TAT was defined as transfusion to a recipient who 1) had a confirmed WNV infection (3) and 2) had received a blood product from a NAT-reactive index donation associated with a donor with WNV-specific IgM antibody in the index donation or a follow-up collection. A confirmed TAT case was defined as meeting the criteria for a probable case and having any one of the following criteria: 1) unlikely mosquito exposure during the 14 days before recipient illness onset; 2) testing of remaining diagnostic samples from the hospitalized transfusion recipient indicating that WNV infection occurred at the time of transfusion; or 3) transfusion of a co-component of the infectious donation into another recipient who then had a confirmed WNV infection. A case was classified as a noncase if WNV infection could not be confirmed in the recipient <4 weeks after the implicated transfusions, if WNV RNA was not identified in any implicated donation, or if all implicated donors were seronegative for WNV. If samples were not available to satisfy the criteria for probable, confirmed, or noncase classification, the case was considered inconclusive. During 2003, a total of 23 suspected cases of WNV TAT were reported to CDC. Public health authorities reported 15 suspected cases of WNV TAT among patients who had WNV illness after receiving transfusions. Another eight suspected cases were in recipients of components derived from low-level viremic donations that were identified during special retrospective studies of MP-negative blood retested with IDT NAT by two BCAs. Follow-up of these eight cases was performed to determine if WNV infection had resulted from the implicated transfusions. As a result of these 23 investigations, six cases were classified as confirmed or probable WNV TAT, 11 as noncases, and three as inconclusive. As of March 27, 2004, three cases remained under investigation.
In each of these six confirmed or probable cases, the recipient received components from multiple donations; however, only one infectious blood component was found in each case. All six of these infectious donations had been collected during July 29-September 18, 2003, and were not identified in MP screening. The median age of the six recipients was 63 years (range: 13-82 years); four had WNV encephalitis, one had West Nile fever, and one critically ill patient did not have discernible WNV-compatible illness despite confirmed WNV infection. A sufficient index-donation sample was available to estimate the titer of the implicated donor's viremia in four of six cases: the median estimated viremia was 0.11 plaque-forming units per milliliter (pfu/mL) (range: 0.06-0.5 pfu/mL). Two of these six cases were reported previously (4); a description of a third case follows.
On August 31, 2003, a male aged 13 years was admitted to a hospital with multiple injuries. On September 1, he received three units of packed red blood cells. On September 9, after hospital discharge, he had a maculopapular rash. On September 12, he was readmitted to the hospital with fever, headache, vomiting, and diarrhea, consistent with West Nile fever; blood drawn on that day was positive for WNV-specific IgM antibody.
The three transfused blood units had been collected during the second week of August 2003. No donors of this blood reported symptoms of WNV illness before or after donation. Samples from these donations were nonreactive for WNV RNA by MP NAT performed on six-specimen mini-pools. All other components derived from these three donations were quarantined immediately; there were no co-component recipients. Recalled plasma samples from the three index donations were WNV IgM negative. One donor seroconverted evidenced by development of WNV-specific IgM antibody in serum collected 50 days after donation. Recalled plasma from this donor was reactive when tested by IDT NAT. CDC confirmed results by using polymerase chain reaction; the estimated viral load was 0.09 pfu/mL. The recipient recovered without sequelae.
Editorial Note: Previous studies have documented that an estimated 80% of WNV-infected persons remain asymptomatic but are believed to have viremia lasting a median of 6.5 days (5,6). Asymptomatic WNV-infected persons with viremia likely represent the largest risk group of blood donors. Because symptom screening at the time of blood donation will not identify most viremic donors, screening by NAT was implemented rapidly to identify potentially infectious blood donations by detecting WNV RNA.
Use of blood-donor screening for WNV by NAT under the IND mechanism has enhanced the safety of the blood supply. Despite this enhanced safety, documentation of the six WNV TAT cases in 2003 indicates that blood components containing low levels of virus might escape detection and that at least some of these might be infectious. Virus loads in infectious donations were considerably lower in 2003 than in 2002 (1). In 2002, the estimated viremia levels in implicated donations were 0.8-75 pfu/mL, compared with 0.06-0.5 pfu/mL for TAT cases during 2003. The reasons for this lower range are unclear, and the lower limit of donor viremia that can lead to transfusion-associated infection is unknown.
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Data collected during 2003 will be considered by the blood supply community in collaboration with public health authorities when developing screening strategies for 2004, when widespread seasonal transmission of WNV is expected to continue. MP screening will continue to identify most persons who donate during the short viremic period, but prospective IDT might be implemented in regions with high WNV-infection rates (i.e., high MP-screening-test yields). However, the capacity of laboratory equipment and personnel for performing IDT and the availability of reagents are limited, and the higher false-positive rate of IDT (compared with MP screening) could have a negative short-term impact on the availability of blood in these regions.
Approximately 4.5 million persons receive blood or blood products annually. Although persons needing blood transfusions should be aware of the limited risk for WNV infection, the benefits of receiving needed transfusions outweigh the potential risk for WNV infection. In addition, blood donation poses no risk to the donor for acquiring WNV, and the U.S. Public Health Service encourages blood donation. FDA, CDC, and the blood-collection community will continue to evaluate WNV-screening strategies to ensure blood safety. 
Update

Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance
During the weeks ending October 4, 2003-March 27, 2004, the weekly percentages of patient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) § to approximately 1,000 sentinel providers ranged from 1.0% to 7.6% and exceeded the national baseline of 2.5% ¶ for 9 consecutive weeks, from the week ending November 15, 2003, through the week ending January 10, 2004. The peak percentage (7.6%) of patient visits for ILI occurred during the week ending December 27. For the week ending March 27, the percentage of patient visits for ILI was 0.9%.
Activity Reported by State and Territorial Epidemiologists
Regional influenza activity** was reported by state and territorial epidemiologists in at least one state each week during the weeks ending October 11, 2003-February 21, 2004, and widespread activity was first reported for the week ending October 18. During the week ending December 20, widespread influenza activity was reported in 45 states, and regional activity was reported in four additional states. All states reported either regional (eight states) or widespread (42 states) activity during the week ending December 27. Widespread activity was last reported in one state during the week ending January 24, and the last report of regional activity occurred in one state during the week ending February 21. No widespread, regional, or local influenza activity was reported during the week ending March 27.
Pneumonia and Influenza Mortality Surveillance
During the week ending March 27, 2004, an estimated 7.4% of the deaths reported through the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System were attributed to pneumonia and influenza (P&I). This percentage was below the epidemic threshold † † of 8.2% for that week. 
Influenza-Associated Deaths in Children Aged <18 Years
As of March 27, 2004, CDC had received reports of 142 influenza-associated deaths in U.S. residents aged <18 years occurring in the current season (3). This number represents 21 additional deaths reported since the previous update (1). All patients had evidence of influenza virus infection detected by rapid-antigen testing or other laboratory tests. These data are preliminary and subject to change as more information becomes available.
Avian Influenza Outbreaks
Since early February 2004, avian influenza outbreaks in poultry have been reported from multiple locations in North America, including British Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas (4). Most outbreaks involved influenza A (H7N2) or A (H7N3) strains with low pathogenicity; however, Texas reported an outbreak of highly pathogenic § § avian influenza A (H5N2) among poultry limited to one farm. The farm was quarantined, depopulated, cleaned, and disinfected. Although no confirmed cases of human infection with avian influenza viruses have occurred to date in relation to these outbreaks in the United States, Canadian health authorities have reported two laboratoryconfirmed cases of human influenza A (H7) infection in British Columbia associated with a localized influenza A (H7N3) outbreak in poultry (5, 6) . Both persons were poultry workers § Temperature of >100.0 º F (>37.8 º C) and either cough or sore throat in the absence of a known cause other than influenza. ¶ The national baseline was calculated as the mean percentage of visits for ILI during noninfluenza weeks plus two standard deviations. Wide variability in regional data precludes calculating region-specific baselines and makes it inappropriate to apply the national baseline to regional data. ** Levels of activity are 1) no activity; 2) sporadic-isolated laboratory-confirmed influenza cases or laboratory-confirmed outbreak in one institution, with no increase in activity; 3) local-increased ILI in one region, or at least two institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in one region; virus activity is no greater than sporadic in other regions; 4) regional-increased ILI activity or outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least two but fewer than half of the regions in the state, and 5) widespread-increased ILI activity or outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least half the regions in the state. † † The expected seasonal baseline proportion of P&I deaths reported by the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System is projected by using a robust regression procedure in which a periodic regression model is applied to the observed percentage of deaths from P&I during the preceding 5 years. The epidemic threshold is 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline (2). § § Avian influenza (AI) viruses are classified into low pathogenic (LPAI) and high pathogenic (HPAI) forms on the basis of genetic sequence and the severity of illness they cause in infected birds. (2). Influenza-associated pediatric deaths received considerable attention this season, and CDC requested that state and local health departments report influenza-associated deaths in persons aged <18 years (3). The number of new reported deaths has declined as influenza activity has decreased, with only five new deaths occurring since January 26. Further data collection regarding these reports is ongoing, and efforts are under way to track national pediatric influenza-associated deaths annually.
The avian influenza viruses isolated from the North American poultry outbreaks in 2004 are unrelated to the A (H5N1) epizootic in southeast Asia (4). Influenza A (H7) viruses cause outbreaks among poultry, but do not typically infect humans. In 2002, Virginia experienced an outbreak of avian influenza A (H7N2) in which 4.7 million turkeys and chickens were destroyed. One culler had upper respiratory symptoms and was tested subsequently and found to have antibodies to avian influenza A (H7N2) (7) . In 2003, the Netherlands reported outbreaks of avian influenza A (H7N7) in poultry on several farms (8) . In that report, a total of 89 persons had confirmed H7N7 influenza virus infection associated with this outbreak, accounting for 83 cases of conjunctivitis, seven cases of ILI, and one death. Since that time, additional H7N7 infections among humans have not been reported. In response to the avian influenza outbreaks in poultry in the United States, CDC has issued interim recommendations for persons with possible exposure to avian influenza. Those recommendations are available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/han022404.htm. More information regarding human H7 cases in North America is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/interimreport.htm.
Influenza surveillance reports for the United States are published weekly during October-May. These reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm and through CDC's voice (telephone 888-232-3228) and fax (telephone 888-232-3299, document number 361100) information systems.
Notice to Readers
Manufacturer's Recall of Human Rabies Vaccine -April 2, 2004
On April 2, this notice was posted as an MMWR Dispatch on the MMWR website (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr).
CDC and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have been notified that a recent quality-assurance test of IMOVAX ® Rabies Vaccine (Aventis Pasteur, Swiftwater, Pennsylvania) identified the presence of noninactivated Pitman-Moore virus (the attenuated vaccine strain) in a single product lot. The manufacturer has indicated that additional lots of recalled vaccine were distributed internationally. These lots also passed all release tests, including testing to confirm the absence of live virus. The manufacturer is working with regulatory authorities to determine lot numbers of vaccine and countries that might have received recalled lots. More information about these internationally distributed lots will be provided as it becomes available.
Aventis Pasteur is providing additional detailed information to all distributors and providers. Health-care providers should contact persons who received recalled vaccine to implement the recommendations outlined in this notice (see Recommendations for Persons Who Received Recalled Vaccine). In addition, persons who know they received rabies vaccine between September 23, 2003, and April 2, 2004, should contact their health-care providers to determine whether they received vaccine from one of the four lots being recalled and, if so, whether they should be treated as outlined below. Vaccine distributors and health-care providers who have any remaining doses of the recalled lots should not use them and should contact Aventis Pasteur regarding their disposition. Information about this recall is available from the Aventis Pasteur Medical Information Services Department, telephone 800-835-3587, or at http://www.vaccineshoppe.com.
All persons who have begun a rabies vaccination series (whether for pre-or postexposure prophylaxis) must complete that vaccination series on time, using nonrecalled vaccine. Information about human rabies prevention based on current recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056176.htm.
Recommendations for Persons Who Received Recalled Rabies Vaccine
Most persons receiving rabies vaccine do so because of exposure to a rabid animal, and treatment is needed to prevent fatal illness. Thus, persons who are receiving postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) must not omit or delay receiving any remaining injections; injections needed to complete the series should use nonrecalled vaccine. Recalled vaccine is considered fully immunogenic, and previously administered doses can be considered a dose in a PEP regimen.
Although unlikely, a theoretical possibility exists that persons who received vaccine from a recalled lot could have been exposed to the noninactivated Pitman-Moore vaccine strain of rabies virus. Even in the event of such an exposure, the timely administration of treatment, as described here, will help to ensure negligible risk to persons who have received vaccine from a recalled lot. Persons who received recalled vaccine should receive treatment equivalent to PEP, similar to published guidelines, as follows:
Persons who were vaccinated with recalled vaccine as part of a course of PEP for a possible rabies exposure.
• Not previously immune (i.e., persons who had not received at least 3 doses of vaccine at some time before the possible rabies exposure). Persons without prior immunity who have a possible rabies exposure routinely receive a 5-dose postexposure immunization series. If this postexposure series has not already been completed, such persons should complete the full postexposure series, using nonrecalled vaccine to complete the series. Doses that have been administered already as part of the 5-dose series need not be repeated, even if recalled vaccine was used. In addition, if rabies immune globulin (RIG)* was not administered with the first dose of vaccine and it has been <7 days since the first dose of vaccine, RIG should be administered at this time. Once PEP is completed, per-* Where available (including the United States), Human Rabies Immune Globulin (HRIG) is preferred and is administered in a dose of 20 IU/kg. Where HRIG is not available, Equine Rabies Immune Globulin may be used in a dose of 40 IU/kg. These dosages are applicable for all age groups, including children. For persons receiving RIG after having received recalled vaccine administered as part of PEP, as much of the dose as is anatomically feasible should be infiltrated at the site of the original rabies exposure (e.g., a wound), and as much of the remaining dose as is anatomically feasible should be infiltrated at the site(s) where the recalled vaccine was injected. If any RIG remains, it should be administered intramuscularly at an anatomically distant site. Persons receiving RIG for recalled vaccine administered as part of a preexposure vaccination series should have as much of the dose as is anatomically feasible infiltrated at the site(s) where recalled vaccine was administered, and the rest should be administered intramuscularly at an anatomically distant site. RIG should never be administered in the same syringe as vaccine, or into the same anatomical site used for concomitant vaccination. Because RIG might partially suppress active production of antibody, no more than the recommended dose should be administered.
sons are considered fully vaccinated against both the original rabies exposure and any possible exposure to noninactivated virus in the recalled vaccine.
• Previously immune (i.e., persons who had received at least 3 doses of vaccine at some time before the possible rabies exposure). Persons with preexisting immunity (i.e., who have completed a full preexposure or postexposure vaccination series) who then have a possible rabies exposure routinely receive 2 booster doses of rabies vaccine. If one or both doses already were administered using recalled vaccine, such persons should receive 2 more doses, using nonrecalled vaccine. RIG is not recommended.
Persons who were vaccinated with recalled vaccine for reasons other than a possible rabies exposure.
• Not previously immune (i.e., persons who had not received at least 3 doses of vaccine at some previous time). Persons without prior immunity who received recalled vaccine as part of a 3-dose preexposure vaccination series should receive additional doses using nonrecalled vaccine for a total of 5 doses (dosing intervals should follow the PEP schedule as closely as possible). RIG* is recommended if <7 days have elapsed since administration of the first dose of vaccine.
• Previously immune (i.e., persons who had received at least 3 doses of vaccine at some previous time). Persons with preexisting immunity (i.e., who have completed a full preexposure or postexposure vaccination series before they received recalled vaccine) who received recalled vaccine as a routine booster dose should receive 2 additional doses of nonrecalled vaccine. RIG is not recommended. All clinically significant adverse events following receipt of rabies vaccine should be reported to 1) Aventis Pasteur, telephone 800-835-3587 and 2) the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) at http://www.vaers.org, or telephone 800-822-7967. Additional information about rabies and its prevention is available from CDC, telephone 404-639-1050, or at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/rabies.
Notice to Readers
Sexual Assault Awareness Month, April 2004
April is Sexual Assault Awareness Month (SAAM). During this month, 59 state and territorial rape prevention and education programs, other partners, and CDC will highlight activities that increase awareness about sexual violence. One of six U.S. women and one of 33 U.S. men have been victims of rape or attempted rape as a child or as an adult (1 Because of increased vaccination efforts in the United States, incidences of the majority of vaccine-preventable diseases have decreased approximately 99% from peak prevaccine levels (1). In 2003, a total of 42 measles cases, one diphtheria case, and no wild poliovirus cases were reported (2,3). Approximately 11,000 infants are born each day in the United States; they need approximately 20 doses of vaccine before age 2 years to protect them from 11 vaccine-preventable diseases (4). Although vaccination coverage levels are high for children of preschool age, approximately 1 million children aged 2 years are missing >1 recommended vaccine dose (5) .
During NIIW, states and approximately 500 communities in the United States will sponsor activities highlighting the need to achieve and maintain high childhood vaccination coverage rates. Special events, including provider education activities, media events, and immunization clinics also are planned along the United States-Mexico border in collaboration with the United States-Mexico Border Health Commission. In addition, CDC and its partners will debut a new public service campaign consisting of a 30-second public service announcement (PSA) in English and Spanish, a Spanish video news release, Spanish and English text for live radio PSAs, and posters and print ads in Spanish and English. NIIW is being held in con- 6  12  ----55  48  689  716  Oreg.  2  5  1  1  --93  74  179  225  Calif.  15  22  ----384  501  6,181  5,931  Alaska  1  -----11  17  147  137  Hawaii  4  -----18  24  1  245 Guam 
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